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Abstract. The feeling (quale) brings the “Hard Problem” to philosophy
of mind. Does the subjective feeling have a non-ignorable impact on In-
telligence? If so, can the feeling be realized in Artificial Intelligence (AI)?
To discuss the problems, we have to figure out what the feeling means,
by giving a clear definition. In this paper, we primarily give some main-
stream perspectives on the topic of the mind, especially the topic of the
feeling (or qualia, subjective experience, etc.). Then, a definition of the
feeling is proposed through a thought experiment, the “semi-transparent
room”. The feeling, roughly to say, is defined as “a tendency of changing
input representations by representing its inner state”. Also, a formalized
definition is given. The definition does not help to verify “having the feel-
ing”, but it helps to provide evidence. Based on the definition, we think
these are the hard problems of intelligence – whether the “innate” feeling
plays an important role in Intelligence, whether the difference between
the “simulated” feeling and the “innate” feeling will have a significant
influence on Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), and, if so, where the
“innate” feeling comes from and how to make an artificial agent possess
it.
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1 Background
There may be a gap between intelligence and mind, that is, the feeling – how
can an objective agent have the subjective feeling?
We must primarily clarify on the related concepts involved. The mind in this
paper refers to the conscious mind, and the consciousness refers in particular
to phenomenal consciousness or called subjective experience that has qualia [9].
The feeling discussed in this paper is a kind of phenomenal consciousness. It is
emphasized that the feeling in this paper is subjective, which means it is private,
unable to represented, and truly experienced by us – that is, the feeling per se
and representations of the feeling are distinguished (see Sec. 3).
We are concerned about the general laws and principles of intelligence. A
consensus is that the best reference to achieving AGI is our mind. We ourselves
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have subjective experience, or the feeling, while it is questionable to study the
objective intelligence with the mind as a reference: Are we studying its objec-
tive aspect, or are we studying both the subjective and the objective aspects at
the same time? In a sense, science involves a methodology – testing hypothe-
ses, forming theories, and predicting objective phenomena. Falsifiability is an
important character of scientific theory, but only objective phenomena can be
discussed with falsifiability. The falsification of the subjective feeling is difficult
– when the subject claims that it feels something, how can we deny it? How
do we determine that the “non-self” has the feeling? Therefore, what we study
is the objective aspect of the mind, that is, intelligence. In our view, the laws
and principles of intelligence are completely objective, so it can be studied and
tested by scientific means, while the mind (especially its subjective experience
or feeling) is more difficult to study with the existing scientific paradigm.
The issue of the mind-body relationship is one of the most central issues in
philosophy of mind. What is the relationship between the mind (especially the
conscious mind) and the body (or matter)? On this issue, the most mainstream
view at present is physicalism. Physicalists believe that the physical domain is
causally closed, all facts including psychological facts are physical facts, and all
information is physical information [9]. Within physicalism, there are reductive
physicalism and non-reductive physicalism. The reductive physicalism advocates
that the mind is equivalent to the activity of a specific brain or a neural system,
that mental states can be reduced to certain states of brains or neural system,
and psychology can be reduced to neuroscience. Phenomenal consciousness or
the feeling can also be reduced to a certain physiological state – for example,
pain is the activation of C-fibers. Non-reductive physicalism believes that the
mental state is determined by the physiological state in some way, and the former
supervenes on the latter. Phenomenal consciousness and qualia supervene on
the basic physiological structure and function of the organism, which means
that if the physiological state of two organisms are exactly the same, then their
conscious experience will also be the same. When the organism feels pain, it is
inevitable that the neural C-fibers of the organism will be activated. As a non-
reductive physicalism, mind-body supervenience is currently widely accepted [8].
A description of mind-body supervenience is:
The mental supervenes on the physical in that if anything x has a mental
property M , there is a physical property P such that x has P , and
necessarily any object that has P has M . [9]
Under the context of AGI, a similar view holds that the “phenomenal aspect”
of consciousness is a first-person perspective of a process, while the “functional
aspect” is a third-person perspective of the same process. The two are different
aspects of the same object, and the two cannot be separated [14].
The current scientific or AGI theories about the mind are mostly about cal-
culations or functions, and they aim to solve the so-called “simple problems” [4].
For example, Crick and Koch proposed the “neurobiological theory of conscious-
ness”, assuming that the neural oscillations in the brain is the basis of conscious-
ness and the neural correlation with awareness [5]. Crick and Koch hypothesized
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that information is binded through synchronized oscillations of neuronal groups
that “represent relevant content”. Bernard Baars proposed the global workspace
theory of consciousness: it assumes that the content of consciousness is contained
in a global workspace (that is, a central processing unit), which coordinates other
independent and competing parts as a public blackboard visited by them [1, 2].
NARS (Non-Axiom Logical Reasoning System) proposed by Pei Wang uses the
term SELF to refer to the system itself, in order to achieve self-awareness and
self-control [13]. Although Wang claims that the phenomenal and functional
aspects of consciousness are different perspectives of the same object [14], its
implicit meaning seems to be that the functional aspect supervenes on the phe-
nomenal aspect, and the realization of the former naturally comes with the latter,
but what NARS currently achieves is only the functional aspect of consciousness.
The system has the characterization of “subjective experience”, but we are not
sure whether the system can really have the subjective feeling4, which is private
and hard to represented5.
What we concern is always how to create AGI. If the feeling is necessary for
AGI, then the ceiling will become obvious – only by understanding the essence
of the feeling can we know how to create it. In this paper, we point out in the
end the difficulties that may be faced with in the study of intelligence under
some existing arguments of philosophy of mind.
2 The explanatory gap and the hard problem.
None of the above-mentioned scientific theories about consciousness provide an
explanation for the feeling per se [4], and we think neither does NARS. They
describe how to represent and calculate, not how to experience the feeling. This
is related to a very critical issue in philosophy of mind, that is, the “explanatory
gap” and the “hard problem”, both of which point the finger at the subjective
aspect of the mind, that is, the subjective feeling.
Joseph Levine pointed out that there is an insurmountable explanatory gap
between material substance and subjective experience [10]. Levine took the sub-
jective experience of pain as an example to show the difficulty of finding neural
correlates of consciousness. Although Levine have been unwilling to draw any
ontological conclusions about anti-physicalism from the explanatory gap [11,12],
some neo-dualists try to use the explanatory gap to refute physicalism, for ex-
ample, Chalmers David expressed the explanatory gap as a “hard problem” of
4 The feeling here is not a type of term or concept in NARS, since it cannot be
represented explicitly and measured directly. And the subjective experience here
does not refer to the same thing with experience in NARS.
5 The word “subjective” here is not completely the same as that in NARS. In our
view, a NARS agent is subjective in the sense that its knowledge (experience) repre-
sentations are determined by its “agent-specific” environment (or input). However,
the subjective feeling in this paper refers to something without representation. The
feeling itself and representations of the feeling are distinguished in this paper. See
Sec. 3
4 B. Xu, et al.
consciousness [4]. There is no reliable evidence to support physicalism and op-
pose dualism.
More concretely, if mind-body supervenience is right, why is it pain instead of
itch when some neurophysical state arises? To explain the relationship between
the neurophysical state and the feeling of pain is the so-called explanatory gap.
At the same time, we are of course “easy” to answer the “simple problem(s)”,
like “how can a physical system learn or remember?”, but difficult to answer the
“hard problem(s)”, similar to “how does a physical system experience pain?”.
Since representations are theoretically objective, observable, and computable, we
can study the interaction mechanism of representations through neuroscience,
cognitive science, and intelligence science, while the feeling is subjective, difficult
to observe, and probably impossible to calculate or simulate.
Why a certain physical state corresponds to a certain feeling rather than other
feelings, and how a physical system has the subjective feeling, are also important
for creating AGI, especially when an AGI system must have the feeling. At times,
they are unavoidable. As Kim said:
Suppose that you are now given an assignment to design a “pain box”,
a device that can be implanted in your robot that not only will detect
damage to its body and trigger appropriate avoidance behavior but also
will enable the robot to experience the sensation of pain when it is ac-
tivated. Building a damage detector is an engineering problem, and our
engineers, we may presume, know how to go about designing such a
device. But what about designing a robot that can experience pain? It
seems clear that even the best and brightest engineers would not know
where to begin. What would you need to do to make it a pain box rather
than an itch box, and how would you know you have succeeded? The
functional aspect of pain can be designed and engineered into a system.
But the qualitative aspect of pain, or pain as a quale, seems like a wholly
different game. [9]
Can the explanation gap be bridged? One way is the identification of the
mental state and the neurophysical state. Its basic position is that the feeling,
like pain, and its corresponding neurophysical state are identical in definition.
This position does not provide a meaningful explanation for the gap between
consciousness and the brain — it directly excludes the existence of the gap. The
other is the functional analysis of the mental state, that is, the feeling is defined
as a behavioral process. For example, “in a painful state” is defined as “a state
that is caused by tissue damage and leads to aversion behaviors.” In this way, the
question “why a certain representation is related to a certain experience in x and
systems like x” was well explained [9]. However, has the difficult problem really
been solved? We cannot deny having the kind of true feeling that we experience.
If we follow the view of mind-brain identification, this kind of true feeling does
not seem to exist anymore; from the perspective of functional analysis, we are
just an objective physical process without the true feeling. How does that kind
of the true feeling come about?
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As another question, is the subjective feeling necessary for us? Kim pointed
out that neuroscience and cognitive science acquiesce in epiphenomenalism,
which implicitly agrees that the feeling/experience does not cause any effects.
Therefore, the feeling cannot be studied by scientific methods:
Qualia are epiphenomenal; they cause no effects in the physical domain.
If so, how can they even be observed? How can their presence be known to
the investigator? There can be no instrument to detect their occurrence
and identify them. Qualia cannot register on any measuring instruments
because they have no power to affect physical objects or processes. No
one thinks the brain scientist can “directly” observe a subject’s conscious
state, phenomenal or nonphenomenal; direct observation of a conscious
state requires experiencing it, and the scientific observer of course is not
experiencing the subject’s conscious states. [9]
Can we agree that the feeling will not affect future decisions and behaviors?
The answer is, no. It is possible that experience plays a causal role. On the
one hand, when we feel pain at the moment, the subjective feeling makes us
hard to forget, so that when we see a similar scene in the future, we want to
escape. Of course, some people may also say that if the feeling is defined as a
behavioral process, then the subjective feeling is epiphenomenal and will not
have an effect on objective objects. What if the feeling cannot be defined as a
specific process? As will be discussed in the next section, the subjective feeling
does not correspond to a specific process, but it is related to a relatively more
complex adaptation procedure. The subjective feeling leads to causal effects
through adaptation (or adaptive behaviors). On the other hand, just as it is
difficult for us to directly prove through experiments that the subjective feeling
really leads to causal effects, it is also difficult to prove that the subjective
feeling is in the leaf node of a causal graph. Both of these possibilities should be
considered. In our opinion, the feeling is still an unresolved issue.
As AGI researchers, we have to consider what this problem means for AGI
research. If the feeling is epiphenomenal, we certainly do not need to consider
the feeling, and only consider the interaction mechanism of representations. By
contrast, the reason is different from Wang. The reason of ours is that the feeling
(as an epiphenomenon) does not cause any effects (so it will not have any impact
on creating AGI). However, there is another possibility that experience plays a
secret and critical role in our intelligence. Then, the causal effect it produces will
be displayed on “instruments”, and we can model it in a certain way by proposing
a certain computational model to simulate the real feeling. Then there comes the
question: can the subjective feeling be simulated through computational models?
If it cannot be simulated accurately, will there be any serious consequences?
These questions are difficult to answer, but through further discussion, we may
have a deeper understanding as well as inspirations on these questions.
3 A definition of feeling
We start by describing our positions about the feeling:
6 B. Xu, et al.
(1) The feeling is something we truly experience. Even if the feeling is repre-
sented by words like happy, neurophysical states like neuronal membrane-
voltage, hormone like dopamine, etc., they are not the feeling per se but the
representations of the feeling.
(2) The feeling could be expressed to form the representations, otherwise it is a
non-existence for an observer.
(3) The feeling should not be defined as any specific and fix function, because
doing so confounds the feeling and representations of the feeling.
(4) The feeling should be somehow measured for researching AGI, with a defi-
nition that captures the essence of the feeling in some degree.
Consider such a thought experiment.
3.1 The semi-transparent room
There is a room like this: From the outside, it is visually completely transparent,
physically inaccessible, and unable to be observed by any scientific instruments
– unless there is matter (such as photon) emitted from the room. However,
information from the outside world can reach the inside unimpededly. There is
a person living in the room, we might as well call her Ann. We can generally
agree that Ann has the same subjective feeling as us, because she has the same
physical structure as us. From the outside to observe, the room is smaller than
the smallest particle physicists know (e.g. quark) as if it is transparent, while
from the inside to observe it is large enough for a person to live in. Now that
we know that the information transmission of this room is asymmetrical, we
might as well call it a “semi-transparent room”. The properties of the room
are consistent with those of the feeling – especially, observed from the outside,
(1) the feeling itself is private without external representations, and (2) it is
unknown where the feeling comes from, although under the “god view” we know
that the feeling comes from Ann. Below, we discuss under the “god view” unless
an observer is specified explicitly.
Ann senses winds and the sun, as well as storms, and correspondingly she
feels happiness as well as pain – a breeze makes her happy, and an electric shock
makes her painful. However, so far, this room will not have any causal effects
on the outside, and Ann cannot express her feelings to the outside world in any
way.
This room is like a “mind”, or in other words, a mind lives in it, and it has
the subjective feeling. Although it does not present any physical state, or in
other words, it only has a “none” state when observed from the outside, and its
internal state can be ever-changing. This negates the idea that a feeling must
correspond to a physical state for an observer outside.
You might say that, in fact, observed inside the room, Ann’s feelings cor-
respond to different neurophysical states. However, this is contrary to the ex-
perimental setting. Observers can only observe it outside the room but cannot
enter the room – just as we human can only measure the membrane voltage
(or other physical indicators) of a neuron, but we cannot know “the feeling of a
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neuron” if there is a “room” inside the neuron. Even if a human “enters” a brain,
he does not enter the room – because representations of neural activations (e.g.
spikes) are something observed outside the room6. The setting of the experiment
is reasonable, because feeling is a private thing.
You might say that the state of the semi-transparent room has actually
changed because the external state has changed, and in fact, in the case of
the semi-transparent room, the (neuro-)physical state is represented by the ex-
ternal state. Then we can consider such a situation: the external state remains
unchanged, it has always been so windy and sunny. Ann feels happiness at first,
but as time passed, she becomes bored with this unchanged outside state, and
her happiness fades away. An objectively observed state outside can indeed cor-
respond to different feelings inside.
You might say that if this is the case, then the feeling becomes something
similar to an epiphenomenon, which is at a leaf node in a causal graph and does
not produce any additional effects. Indeed, if the feeling cannot be represented
in any way and affects the physical state outside, then what is the difference
between its existence and non-existence for an observer outside? If the feeling is
an epiphenomenon, it is easier to handle. AGI researchers can ignore it, because
it will not have any impact on the behavior of the system, will not have any
impact on agents’ interactions with the environment, and will not have any
impact on agents’ achieving goals.
Is this really the case? According to our experience, it is obviously not. When
we feel pain, we will escape, scream, cry bitterly, and express this feeling in
various ways. Therefore, a reasonable approach is to give Ann a channel to
express her feelings.
3.2 Adding a button to the room
Now, the experimental setting is changed – there is an extra button in the
semi-transparent room. After Ann presses the button in the room, photons are
emitted with a wavelength of about 700nm from the room to the world outside.
For humans, this is a red light. Whenever the room emits a red light, if the
environment is in a state of electric shock, it will become a state of non-electric-
shock, that is, if Ann feels pain at this time, when she presses the button, this
painful state will subside. After many explorations, she discovered this pattern.
From then on, whenever Ann feels pain, she would press the button. At this
time, outside observers would see a red light, which, under the “god view”, is a
representation corresponding to Ann’s pain.
Does this mean that any mapping or function corresponds to a feeling? Just
like an existing solution to the explanatory gap, “pain” is defined as the process
from stimulus to response, which is essentially a mapping. However, if this is the
case, then we can also define any function as a feeling. If we feel happy, we laugh
6 The feeling is expressed to form representations which can be observed outside, while
this is the further case, in which Ann is given a button to express the feeling (see
Sec. 3.2).
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and secrete adrenaline; so we define the process of “from ‘stimuli that makes
us happy’ to ‘responses of the body caused by happiness’ ” as the feeling of
“happiness”. Under the context of NARS, an external stimulus, through sensing
and reasoning, leads to an increase in the value of a statement “〈{SELF} →
[happy]〉.”, which in turn leads to activations of related concepts and a series of
effects. Perhaps the feeling of happiness can be defined as the above process, or
as the statement or even the term happy, which can be regarded as a collection
of many functions (many kinds of stimuli lead to changing the value of the
statement, and the statement leads to many kinds of responses; or stimuli related
to the term happy lead to responses related to the term happy). If this is the case
(though the feeling may not be defined as above in NARS, and we just discuss
it with the context of NARS), then we could also think that any function (or
any set of functions) actually has a certain “feel” inside. We could also think of
a mechanical device (a specific input leads to a specific output) as having the
feeling. This is contrary to our intuition, and we cannot agree with this view.
3.3 Equipping the room with a body
Obviously, the feeling cannot be defined as a simple functional process. In order
to understand what the feeling is, let us see how a semi-transparent room with
the subjective feeling would do. Since the following discussion will introduce
another room as an observer of the current room, in order to make it easier to
imagine, we might as well give the room a body, like a stone (a black box, or any
other thing) so that it is seen from the outside world as an independent object
instead of “none”. But when no photons are emitted outward, the body is not
different from an object that looks like the stone and does not seem to have the
feeling. After introducing the “body”, the discussions of the previous sections
are still valid – when there is no button or when Ann does not press the button,
the physical state of the body will not change due to Ann’s feeling.
Another semi-transparent room lives in Bob. Bob’s room (with a body) is
similar to Ann’s. The only difference is that when the button in the room is
pressed, the room emits photons with a wavelength of about 517nm to the outside
world – for humans, this is a green light.
Facing the same environment, Bob and Ann have the feelings caused by the
same representations of stimulus, e.g. electric shock. When Ann is stimulated
by an electric shock, Bob finds that Ann would always emit a red light. From
this Bob concludes that Ann would emit a red light to express pain as he feels.
For the observer Bob, “pain” is defined as a function of “from ‘pain stimulus’ to
‘red light’ ”. However, it is not the case for Ann. For the observer Ann, “pain”
is defined as a function of “from ‘pain stimulus’ to ‘green light’ ”. Have they
really figured out what “pain” is? Indeed, the feeling of pain is explained in a
certain way. However, the gap between the feeling and representations of the
feeling has not been really bridged. We do not really understand why the feeling
of “pain” corresponds to the physical state P instead of another one (such as
P ′), or why the physical state P corresponds to “pain” instead of another one
(such as “itch”), just as the observers, Ann and Bob, do not really understand
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why “pain” corresponds to this color of light instead of that color of light, or
why “pain” corresponds to light instead of something else. It is obviously not
the final answer to define the feeling as a certain specific process, because it
confounds the “representations of the feeling” with “the feeling” per se – red or
green light is a representation of the feeling, and what Ann and Bob experience
internally and privately is the feeling per se.
3.4 The formalized definition of the feeling
If the feeling is not defined as a certain function or process, how to define it?
Let us reconsider the semi-transparent room – there is an adaptive procedure.
When an external stimulus makes Ann feel pain, Ann does not know what to
do. The only thing she can try is to press the button. After several attempts,
she discovers that when she feels pain, pressing the button always makes her feel
better. So she learns to express the feeling of pain – whenever Ann feels pain,
from the outside could always see the red light.
The feeling should actually be a certain specific pattern, in which the agent
expresses the feeling to form representations externally and has a specific ten-
dency to change the specific internal state of the feeling by changing indirectly
the input representation of stimulus. For example, the feeling of “happiness” can
be defined as “things that the agent tends to increase (or get close to)”, and the
feeling of “pain” can be defined as “things that the agent tends to decrease (or
stay away from)”. Formally, we can give the following definition:
For the representation s of a certain stimulus, the agent generates the external
response representation r after thinking, i.e.
r = T (s) (1)
where T is the thinking function. The representation r of the response will
cause a series of effects in the environment, which will eventually lead to a
new representation s′ of a stimulus, i.e.
s′ = E(r) (2)
where E is the environment function. If the agent feels something, it will even-




where D measures the relation between the representations s and s′. For exam-
ple, for the feeling of “pain”, D measures the difference between s and s′. More
concretely, when the agent feels pain, it will try its best to make the represen-
tations of pain appear as few as possible, that is, stay away from the feeling
of pain. The agent adjusts itself to decrease the feeling of pain in its future –
because the feeling of pain is defined as “something that the agent tends to
stay away from”. In any case, when the agent feels pain, it will have thoughts
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of moving away from it, which will lead to the behavior of moving away from
it. This procedure is adaptive. For a varying environment, the representation of
pain may be varying, but this tendency remains unvarying. Different tendencies
may associate with different Ds, and the form can be unvarying. For example,
for the feeling of “happiness”, the corresponding D measures not difference but
similarity.
We cannot limit the environment and conditions for observing the behav-
iors of a certain agent. Here is the reason. For any mechanical process, if the
above definition is not met, for example, no matter how Ann presses the button,
the room would not have external representations despite the internal feeling,
while the room would always produce mechanically specific stimuli without any
adaptation, then the feeling, corresponding to the mechanical process, does not
exist externally – there is no difference between existence and non-existence of
the feeling. For such a completely mechanical room, even if Ann’s room would
emit a red light under a certain stimulus, which decreases Ann’s pain, then we
cannot say there is the feeling observed from the outside – when the environment
E changes, the original red light would not decrease Ann’s pain – For example,
originally, as long as Ann presses the button, her pain is decreased, but now the
button might be switched at a certain frequency to emit a flashing red light,
so that Ann’s pain would be decreased. However, observed from the outside, it
seems that Ann’s room would have not made a change for the environment, or
Ann would have not adjusted herself to stay away from the pain. Then we can-
not think that there is the feeling in Ann’s room – because it is not essentially
different from a simple, mechanical process without the feeling, or the feeling
does not cause any effects. A specific function may work in many circumstances
without any adaptation, but if a new circumstance occurs while the agent can-
not adapt to it to decrease the pain, that is the above definition is not met, we
cannot say the agent have the feeling.
We can only judge whether an object may have the feeling through external
performance, but cannot really give a doubtless conclusion. This does not mean
that we are caught in a skeptical dilemma, because through observing behaviors,
a bridge has been built between the subjective and the objective.The subjective
feeling affects objective representations in some way, so that the subjective feeling
becomes measurable and falsifiable in some degree. For an agent that meets the
above definition, we can say that the statement “that the agent has the feeling”
has “positive evidence”. For an agent that does not meet the above definition,
we cannot say that it does not have the feeling, but we can say that there is no
evidence showing that it has the feeling.
Of course, we do not deny either that NARS may be able to have the feeling
(for its adaptability), or that an AI system may be able to have the feeling in the
future. If NARS or other AI systems meet the definition of the feeling, “positive
evidence” is provided to accept that the system has the feeling.
This definition is acceptable for AGI, because if the feeling exists only as
an epiphenomenon without causing any effects, then its existence will not have
any impact on the system. If this is the case, what if we think that the system
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does not actually feel? The feeling is irrelevant to AGI at this time. But if
the subjective feeling can actually affect the behaviors of an agent, and if it
has indistinguishable behaviors from the agent with the “real” feeling (such as
humans), then the former agent is identical to the agent with the “real” feeling,
and we can think of the former agent as having the feeling.
The discussion is preliminary. Some more complex cases is not considered.
For example, the feeling may be inhibited and not be expressed, but will cause
some effects afterwards; an agent may “enjoy” the “pain”. Some other complex
emotions with the feeling are not discussed either. These will make the T and
D more complex to model, and we will leave these cases to the future work.
However, we think the definition captures the essence of the feeling in some
degree.
3.5 Is the explanatory gap bridged?
Explanatory gap requires an answer to how the mental state M corresponds to
the physical state P . According to the above discussion, before adaptation, M
and P are not in correspondence. There is no direct correspondence between the
pain and the external stimuli as well as the red light emitted by Ann’s room.
However, after a period of time, Ann finds that whenever she feels pain, pressing
the button will make her feel more comfortable (the pain is decreased). Observed
from the outside, the stimulus, such as an electric shock, will make the room glow
red. The stimulus will also make Bob feel pain, and Bob observes that when
Ann receives an electric shock, red light always appears, so Bob, the observer of
Ann’s room, would think that pain corresponds to the physical representation
of red light. Similarly, Ann, the observer of Bob’s room, would think that pain
corresponds to the representation of green light. If Ann and Bob can observe their
own light, then at least they have come to the conclusion that pain corresponds
to the representation of light. The mental state M (pain) corresponds to the
physical state P (red/green/any light) in this way. Ann and Bob’s belief, that
the pain is caused by the electric shock, is not just derived from the process
“from ‘electric shock’ to ‘light”’, but also the procedure of adaptation. In other
words, even if the external environment function E has changed, Bob and Ann
still show the same behavior pattern of adaptation, which conforms to the above
definition.
In this sense, is the explanatory gap bridged? At least, we have seen how the
mental state M (of “pain”) corresponds to the physical state P (as a represen-
tation).
4 The “Hard Problem” of intelligence
From the above definition, the feeling must form external representations before
we have positive evidence to accept its existence; at the same time, this implies
a point of view that the feeling can be purely internal and unrepresented. So
there are two cases that need to be specifically discussed.
12 B. Xu, et al.
For the first case, just like the counterfactual “philosophical zombie” (al-
though this case may be unreasonable, but it still needs to be explained), if the
agent’s external performance is the same as one without the subjective feeling,
then the feeling could be an epiphenomenon; the feeling does not affect the ob-
jective process, and we need to only study the objective laws of intelligence. For
AGI researchers, the “philosophical zombie” case is acceptable. It doesn’t matter
if there is no real feeling – human-level intelligence can also be reached without
the feeling.
For the second case, an agent may inhibit expressing the feeling, so as not
to form an externally observable representation. If the private feeling is not ex-
pressed, that is, Ann or Bob does not press the button, then we cannot claim as
before that “at this time, it will not cause external effects, so it will not affect
the objective process. For AGI, it does not matter whether it exists or not.” In
this case, the internal causal effect cannot be ignored, that is, although there is
no representation of the feeling at present, the internal feeling is indeed experi-
enced. So at some point in the agent’s future, the current inhibited expression
of the feeling leads to a distinct representation. In this case, T becomes more
complicated, but the form in the definition of the feeling remains unchanged.
However, reconsidering the above two cases, we are still not sure whether a
“philosophical zombie” without the feeling will behave differently from an agent
with the feeling, nor can we know exactly what D and T are. Of course, we can
strive to find a computational model.
We call the computational model that meets the definition of the feeling
above as the “simulated” feeling, and call the natural being of the feeling as the
“innate” feeling.
The question then becomes, if this “simulated” feeling is somewhat different
from the “innate” feeling, will it lead to a serious impact on an AGI system?
How accurately can a computational model fit the “innate” feeling? All these
need to be answered through experiments – We should find an agent with the
“innate” feeling and compare the artificial agent with it, and see if they behave
the same.
Unfortunately, in the above definition, it is assumed that the test circum-
stances must be open, which is crucial for AGI. Will an agent with the “simu-
lated” feeling behaves the same as one with the “innate” feeling at any circum-
stances? This is difficult to confirm, because the condition of “any circumstances”
is difficult to achieve, and an experiment can only test a model under limited
circumstances. A more serious issue is how to compare the two kinds of agents
“fairly” to judge if they behave the same.
In addition, what if the “innate” feeling cannot be fully modeled by a com-
putational process? If it is necessary to have such the “innate” feeling in order to
achieve human-level or higher-level AI, or realize the mind with artifacts, then
where does the feeling ultimately come from, and how to achieve an interface
that allows the “innate” feeling to be expressed?
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Perhaps this is the hard problem for intelligence – in summary, if the “innate”
feeling cannot be realized, what kind of impact will it have on the artificial
intelligence system, and if there must be the “innate” feeling, how to realize it?
This problem cannot be answered under the current AI or AGI research, and
it is left to the future. If the problem cannot be solved by the existing classical
computing methods, then the feeling problem is the ceiling of the current AI re-
search, and it must be broken through with the help of additional paradigms or
technical means. It should be noted that this paper only involves discussions un-
der classical aspects, and does not involve perspectives under quantum aspects,
including, quantum brain theory [6], quantum logic [7], quantum cognition [3],
etc. Is a quantum-based machine a plausible option? A separate article may be
needed to address this issue.
5 Summary
If the subjective feeling plays an indispensable role, that is, agents with the feel-
ing and agents without the feeling counterfactually (such as philosophical zom-
bies) are distinct significantly in terms of performances, and if without the feeling
human-level AI cannot be reached, then we must study the feeling. However, the
feeling is subjective and private, while scientists study objective phenomena. If
we cannot measure the feeling, we cannot study intelligence scientifically.
Therefore, this paper discusses the impact of the subjective feeling on AGI
research. If the feeling is an epiphenomenon, we can just ignore it. Otherwise, it
plays an indispensable role, so we try to give a possible solution for a machine
to have the feeling: We define the feeling as “a tendency to change the input
representation”, and think “that the performance of an agent conforms to this
definition” provides “positive evidence” for “that the agent has the feeling”. If
the definition captures the essence of the feeling, the feeling becomes measurable.
However, whether it is possible and how to find a computational model, for the
“simulated” feeling, to fit the “innate” feeling remain unknown.
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